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Abstract
Many studies have looked at resilience during
natural disasters and national emergencies in a
number of countries but hardly any have
concentrated on developing countries and the
implications of these nations’ sub-standard
healthcare infrastructure, culture practices and
relaxed control systems.
This paper examines
resilience during Liberia’s recent EBOLA epidemic
and identifies lessons to be learned by others
including
executives
of
Non-Governmental
Organizations frequently working on disaster relief
projects in developing countries. The author builds
on existing bodies of work and presents arguments on
why governments in developing countries dealing
with disaster management and disease emergencies
should encourage communities to innovate
autonomously as an important pathway to resilience.
While the author does not provide specific
recommendations, the paper proposes an approach
that can connect the concerns of those implementing
resilience initiatives and vulnerable populations by
harnessing
their
potential
for
innovating
autonomously.

1. Introduction
As Liberians confronted Ebola outbreak (March
2014 -- December 2015) and global observers
grappled with preventing its widespread, the local
people demonstrated resilience by preserving the
social culture of handshakes and customary burial
ceremonies. Unable to predict the new society in
post-Ebola Liberia, community leaders were
sufficiently resilient in buttressing a pretty good set
of drivers to shape future public health practices and
influence decisions about implementing a robust
health system of international standards [29].
WHO defines a health system as one designed to
coordinate all the activities required to promote,
restore and/or maintain health of individuals and
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populations [29]. Inadequacy of healthcare systems in
Liberia, facilitated the ease with which Ebola spread
from one village in Guinea to threaten the lives of
every resident and over 11,000 deaths within a 2years period [3]. Despite Liberia’s Harvard-trained
president, certain cultural differences confound the
absorption and reaction responses to various types of
management decision and implementation of
strategic plans for preventing Ebola.
This paper investigates the determinations and
resilience of the local people, and determines whether
a particular type of leadership can provide nurturing
ground for a predictive model, applicable to disaster
resilience [7]. It begins with a rationale for the study
and declares the need to answer the overarching
research question for this study: “What character
traits or quality of society was on display in Liberia
during the Ebola crises? Next, it summarizes relevant
literature on Liberia’s unstable past for an
understanding of the research context before
presenting a justification for the research method.
That is followed by some discussions of the results
before concluding by suggesting a model that links
global healthcare strategy and national government
commitment to the behavior of citizens during
disasters emergencies.

2. Literature Review
Resilience—as a concept—appears in a large
number of disciplines, presenting numerous
definitions. Not only do these definitions emphasize
different elements or attributes of resilience but also
speak in a general way to the ‘continued ability of a
person, group, or system to adapt to stress—any sort
of disturbance—so that it may continue to function,
or quickly recover its ability to function, during and
after stress’ [1]. Resilience has also been defined as
the capacity of an entity—such as a person, an
institution, or a system—to withstand sudden,
unexpected shocks, and (ideally) to be capable of
recovering quickly afterwards [8]. Resilience, thus,
implies both strength and flexibility, where a resilient
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structure would bend, but would be hard to break
[21].
Africa’s oldest republic, similar in size to Ohio
State was formed when the American Colonization
Society (ACS) purchased a 50-mile stretch land from
6 indigenous tribal chieftains for $100,000 to provide
home for freed US slaves [9]. Now a Christian state
on the West coast of Africa (mainly Baptist,
Methodist, Presbyterian, Protestant Episcopal,
Lutheran, Roman Catholic and Seventh Day
Adventist). Liberia has many Muslims and tribal
religions are practiced in some rural areas. Though
enriched with iron ore, timber, diamonds, gold, and
hydropower, 80% of the 2.5 million inhabitants
consisting of 28 tribes, reside in the capital city [14].
Liberians started to prove resilience when
political upheavals began in 1980s, followed by a
brutal 14-year civil war (1989-2003) resulting into a
steep decline in the living standards of Liberians,
including education and health infrastructure. After
successfully contesting the 2005 presidential
elections, the Harvard educated Mrs. Ellen JohnsonSirleaf was inauguration on January 16, 2006 and
became the first female President in an African
State—reelected in 2011.
During the Ebola crises, she strived to lead a
government considered an operational organization—
seen as an entity that offered predictable, dependable,
capable and adaptable action in support of people at
risk of, or affected by, outbreaks and emergencies, in
ways that strengthen local and national capabilities
[27]. An operational organization needs to be [28]:
 present in outbreaks and emergencies – at local
levels, and nationally;
 capable
of
leading,
coordinating
and
implementing key public health functions;
 equipped with adequate capacity to support
implementation of these functions;
 ready to engage quickly and openly with other
actors for health; and
 consistent in reflecting humanitarian principles,
including impartiality.
Governments dealing with disaster must factor in
socio-organizational conditions of all citizens—
leaving no divide between various stakeholders [6]
[20].

2.1 Ebola Outbreak
CDC (2016) defines Ebola—previously known as
Ebola hemorrhagic fever—as a rare and deadly
disease caused by infection with one of the Ebola
virus species resulting to disease in humans and
nonhuman primates (monkeys, gorillas, and
chimpanzees). First discovered in 1976 near the
Ebola River (in Democratic Republic of Congo), the

disease is caused by infection with a virus of the
family Filoviridae, genus Ebolavirus named by CDC
[3].
The latest outbreak began when Emile Ouamouno
(a 2-year old Guinean) lost her bottle to Ebola on 28
December 2013.
Despite the cancellation of
Liberia’s 167th Independence Day celebrations and a
ban on international flights to Liberia, the disease set
off a worldwide epidemic risking the lives of
232,222,273 in West Africa and an additional
491,108,421 in the USA and Central Europe as well
as the death of more than 11,300 people (see Table
1). It also resulted to the mobilization of a multibillion dollar global response by WHO in 2015 [10].
Table 1 shows Liberia amongst six countries that
recently experienced widespread transmission but
were able to transition and declared free of Ebola
virus transmission—except Sierra Leone where a
new confirmed case was identified in 2016 [4]. WHO
requires that such country remains free of Ebola virus
transmission after 42 days (two incubation periods)
had passed since the last Ebola patient tested
negative.
Declared

Country

EBOLA
Free

Population
Dec-2014

Number of Cases
Suspected Confirmed Deaths

Sierra Leone, W. To
be 6,315,627
Africa
Determined
Liberia, West Africa 1-14-2016
4,396,554

14,124

8,706

3,956

10,678

3,163

4,810

Guinea, W. Africa

12-29-2015

12,275,527

3,814

3,358

2,544

Nigeria, W. Africa

10-29-2014

177,475,986

20

19

8

Mali, W. Africa

1-18-2015

17,086,022

8

7

6

USA, N. America

N/A

318,857,056

4

4

1

Senegal, W. Africa

10-17-2014

14,672,557

1

1

0

Spain, C. Europe

N/A

46,404,602

1

1

0

Italy, C. Europe

N/A

61,336,387

1

1

0

UK, C. Europe

N/A

64,510,376

1

1

0

723,330,694

28,652

19,261

11,325

Totals

Table 1: Countries with Confirmed EBOLA Cases &
Deaths as of June, 2016 [7]; National Populations
from
(http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/
SP.POP.TOTL)

2.2. Healthcare Infrastructure
Healthcare infrastructure is “ensuring wellcoordinated, high-quality health care that requires the
establishment of a supportive health information
system” [15]. The conditions for a high-performance
health systems include a well-distributed workforce,
information systems for data collection, quality
improvement analysis, and clinical communication
support, as well as the organizational capacity to
support culturally competent services and ongoing
improvement efforts [23]. Health authorities in most
sub-Sahara countries do very little to promote health
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care delivery systems designed to support
community-based resources.
Many considered the Ebola crises a window of
opportunity for West African governments to not
only reform healthcare infrastructure and other
institutional structures, but also establish longstanding policies with WHO for better healthcare
systems in Sub Sahara Africa. Similarly, a UN high
level panel on global response to Ebola observed that
inadequate understanding of the cultural context and
poorly designed messaging undermined the response
at the community level [29]. The panel also
recommendation that Governments in developing
countries strengthen and streamline their community
engagement and promote local ownership and trust.
Their report demanded evidence of the following
[29]:
 National authorities and UN partners support the
development and use of national social science
research capacities, along with an international
network of social scientists capable of
mobilizing during a crisis period;
 Principles of effective community engagement
are featured in all training program for national
and international responders.
 National authorities and partners draw on the
potential for South-South cooperation in this
field.
 Communication strategies are developed with
due consideration given to the cultural context.
Healthcare systems also represent true
interpretation of authorities’ performance in key
functions of the national development process [9].
While some may describe the healthcare system in
Liberia as self-managed care [22] the lack of a
modern healthcare infrastructure contributed to a lack
of information support to provide the basis for
continuity in patient records and clinician
communication at a time of medical need [5][19].
Public health lacks appreciation in many
developing countries for improvement in the
knowledge of existing human resources. Evidence
from Western countries show that investing in
community health workers leads to a sustainable
success in virus containment [14][23]. Like most
developing countries, Liberia has very high
unemployment rates, along with a substantial supply
of educated people residing in the West, leaving
government to scramble for qualified people when
crises hit.
In a report presented at the 59th World Health
Assembly, the director general noted that reform of
WHO’s work in health emergency management
recognized the special importance of rapid, accurate
and objective assessments of risks of potentially high

consequences [34]. A program was recently initiated,
under the Executive Director, to do on-the-ground
assessment when notified of a high threat pathogen
(for example, human-to-human transmission of a
novel influenza virus), clusters of unexplained deaths
in high-vulnerability/low-capacity settings, and other
events deemed appropriate at the discretion of the
Director-General [31].
The availability and assignment of a culturally
competent health care workforce has significant
advantages for access to care [12], particularly in
developing countries and especially within the most
vulnerable populations—low-income and uninsured
or underinsured population [2].
A WHO panel recommended the implementation
of complementing health systems with development
programming [29]. They noted that a strong health
systems can be undermined by wider developmental
challenges.
Several
interlocutors
identified
inadequate
water
and
sanitation,
energy,
communications, transportation and road networks as
major obstacles to improving health services. The
Panel also recommends greater complementarity of
development efforts with a view to supporting
strengthened health systems in developing countries,
particularly in rural communities where access to
healthcare is the most limited [31]. They also
recommended that WHO works closely with
development actors to ensure development
programming supports health systems and help to
improve universal and equitable access to quality
healthcare [29].
At the G7 Ise-Shima Summit, G7 leaders,
committed to take the following concrete actions for
advancing global health and dealing with public
health emergencies [10]:
 In addition to its wider reform agenda, urge and
support the WHO to implement its reforms for
outbreaks and health emergencies, in a timely
manner, recognizing also its resource needs, with
the understanding that the WHO should continue
to play the central role in global public health
crisis preparedness and response.
 Welcome the reform of the WHO including to,
(i) establish one single approach for outbreaks
and health emergencies, with one clear line of
authority among all levels of WHO and ultimate
accountability with the Director General as
crystalized in the One WHO approach across
three levels of the Organization, (ii) strengthen
capacity and human resources at all levels, and
(iii) install an independent mechanism to oversee
and monitor the WHO’s performance on
outbreaks and health emergencies.
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Recognize that an operationally robust and
technically competent WHO is crucial for
supporting countries.
Some recommendations for achieving national,
systematic and clinical culture competencies from
literature are as follows [17]:
I. National cultural competence focus on promoting
information dissimilation by national leadership
during early stages of health emergencies for
developing countries:
 Programs that advance information dissimilation
should be encouraged and existing programs
should be strengthened in order to develop a
cadre of information distribution through
academia, government, and private institutions.
 National governments should make it a priority
to invest in and promote emergency planning
within the healthcare infrastructure.
 Local leadership should be formally or
informally involved in deadly disease
prevention’s planning and quality improvement
meetings, whether as part of the local healthcare
board or as part of focus groups.
II. Systemic cultural competence recommendations
focus on eliminating systemic or institutional barriers
to planning for emergencies and improving the health
care system’s ability to monitor and improve the
quality of information about disease crisis [19]:
 Health professionals at county and regional
levels should play a significant role warning
local population about deadly diseases at a very
early stage. Their local influences and ability to
interpreter healthcare services, such as remote
telephone or simultaneous interpretation, should
be used in settings with fewer Ebola patients or
with limited financial or human resources.
 Key health information should reflect the
appropriate level of health literacy, language
proficiency, and cultural norms for the local
populations being served. This includes signage,
specific programs for health promotion and
deadly disease prevention, health education
materials, pre- and post-procedure instructions,
informed-consent
forms,
and
advanced
directives.
 International partners, including USA and
Europe, should require systemic cultural
competence interventions, involving ethnic data
collection and use of local interpreter services) as
part of their assistance to national dealing with
Ebola.
III. Clinical cultural competence recommendations
involves enhancing health professionals’ awareness
of cultural issues and health beliefs while providing

assistance to elicit, negotiate, and manage
information about deadly disease [21]:
 Doctors and nurses should recognize various
cultural impediments in preventing deadly
diseases such as Ebola.
 International clinical staff should enforce
equivalent requirements mandating the provision
of international standards for healing patients of
deadly diseases. Their employers (usually
international institutions) should be held
accountable for sub-standard services they
provide that may prolong deadly diseases.
 Researchers and mangers should identify tools to
detect medical errors that result from lack of
systemic cultural competence, including those
stemming from language barriers. This may
involve allow a patent to take a prescribed
medication incorrectly; misunderstanding health
education materials, instructions, or signage or
even inappropriately preparing for a diagnostic,
resulting in postponement or delay; and
misunderstanding the benefits and risks of
procedures requiring informed consent.
 Government of developing countries that receive
WHO support should collect data on ethnicity,
and language preference for all beneficiaries,
members, and clinical encounters to facilitate the
monitoring of disparities, the reporting of quality
data, and the implementation of initiatives to
prevent deadly diseases like Ebola.

3. Research Method
Literature shows how research in emergency
situations presents many challenges beyond those
normally encountered by social scientists [14].
Precautions from Ebola affected the methodological
side of our research process. Data from our fieldwork
have good validity and reliability, despite taking
necessary precaution for safety within a very lifethreatening context.
Certain methodological
flexibility involving two major components were
applied to the survey. The sampling process and the
data collection were completed using telephone
interviews as the mode of data collection.
Literature review was also structured around
questions likely to be of interest to healthcare policies
in developing countries researchers, and whether
healthcare infrastructure would be a feasible and
affordable venture for preventing another deadly
disease in the future [11][25]. Literature on the
Liberian civil war and its developed path were
reviewed for important theoretical and empirical
contributions relating to resilience.
Computer
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searches resulted from the following keywords:
Liberia, Ebola epidemics, civil war, government
strategic decisions, disaster management, natural
disaster, and international partnerships for crisis
prevention. Analysis of these papers provided useful
insights that resulted into the following main research
questions—meant to aid the creation and
accumulation of knowledge in national healthcare
infrastructure for developing countries:
1) How can the known input, process, and outcome
of Ebola outbreak in Liberia support people
facing similar outbreaks elsewhere?
2) How well did the Liberian government manage
the Ebola crisis?
3) Did the actions of local population contribute to
Ebola spread/cessation?

3.1. Data Collection
Primary data was collected through semi-structure
interview, via telephone, with people who lived in
Liberia during the recent outbreak of Ebola in
Liberia, including a number of Americans and
Europeans who visited Liberia during this period. All
telephone calls were made between January 2015 and
December 2015.
Telephone interview was
considered the best data collection strategy during
and immediately after the outbreak of a deadly
disease as this offered the following advantages:
 quick distribution and response cycle;
 relatively low cost (cheaper than flying to a
neighboring country or distributing laptops to
participants;
 accurate recollection of details; and
 no risks of the researcher contacting or being a
potential carrier of the disease.
Prior to the telephone interviews, the
questionnaire was pre-tested among several Liberians
living in USA and Europe who had a reasonable good
understanding of the healthcare delivery systems in
Liberia. At the end of each individual interview it
was indicated that additional analysis would be
undertaken, especially to assess the quality of data
collected in the survey. Respondents were also asked
whether they were happy to give permission to link
their answers with the official international reports
about the Ebola crisis based on records held by WHO
and CDC. Everyone gave consent and encouraged
their neighbors and friends who were experiencing
similar situation in Liberia to participate in the
research.
As a result, few adjustments were made to the
questionnaire to ensure respondents would have a
deeper understanding of the research objectives.
Respondents were allowed extra time towards the end

of the telephone interview to add additional topic of
relevance to the research objectives.
Gender
Male

Percent
35%

Count
21

Female
Age Range of Participants

65%
Percent

39
Count

15 – 21
22 – 30

8%
12%

5
7

31 – 40
41 - 50

30%
17%

18
10

Above 50
Which part of the Country do you live normally?

33%
Percent

20
Count

Central Monrovia
Greater Monrovia

27%
50%

16
30

Other big cities in Liberia
Small towns in Liberia

17%
7%

10
4

Highest Educational Level
University Graduate

Percent
17%

Count
10

University Student
High School Graduate

18%
42%

11
25

Elementary School Graduate
Never went to School

13%
10%

8
6

Questions About Participants Perception of Ebola Management
Are you a member of the Ebola Control Management Team?

Percentage
15%

Count
9

Have you taken care of a relative or friend who may have
Ebola symptom?
Should the borders have been closed to prevent the Ebola crisis

83%

50

78%

47

Did the Government make the right decision at the beginning
of Ebola?
Did the Government make the right decision when people were
dying?
Did the Ebola end as a result of good decisions by the
Government?
Should people be allow to bury family members who died from
Ebola?
Did everybody do their best to prevent the spread of Ebola?
Do you trust this government to prevent another Ebola
outbreak?
Are you presently engaged in farming to sustain yourself
during the Ebola outbreak?
Did the national government communicate Ebola prevention
properly?
Were competent health workers available in your area to
prevent Ebola?
Were the equipment good enough in your area to prevent
Ebola?
Is the International community doing enough to safe Liberians
from Ebola?
Is the International community doing enough to prevent Ebola
from spreading outside the Liberian border?

22%

13

67%

40

97%

58

18%

11

38%
75%

23
45

65%

39

5%

3

30%

18

7%

4

15%

9

89%

54

Table 2: Partial data from Telephone Survey

3.2. Sample Data
The demographic data of the sample were
collected by asking the respondents their gender, age,
education level, organization level and their amount
of work experience in the field (see Table 2). The
average age of the respondents was 45 years old, with
the standard deviation of 10. Respondents` age varied
from 19 to 68 years. Male respondents made up 35%
of the sample and 65% were female, as is
characteristic of the general Liberian population. The
highest educational level attained was, 17%
university, 18% college level, 42% high school, and
13% elementary school level, while 10% of the
respondents did not have any formal education. 45%
of the respondents had no role in the Ebola control
process, 83% had personal commitment to look after
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family member of close friend but no official
government designated status, 77% of respondents
lived in Monrovia or its suburbs while 17% lived in
other big cities but 7% lives in small rural towns in
Liberia.

4. Discussion
Like most developing countries Liberia’s
response to Ebola was greatly hampered by the lack
of formal instrument for predicting chemical hazard,
natural disasters and deadly diseases—an essential
part of any basic healthcare infrastructure that would
provide a potentially endless as well as essential
resources for societal characteristics that can promote
or inhibit resilience [21]. The following comments
from interviewees confirm the recommendations in
the advisory group’s report for WHO reform [30].
“We do not have the type of leadership required to
support our very dedicated nurses and other
emergency workers when the health of millions of
Liberians is threatened by Ebola outbreak”. A young
college student claimed: “It is rumored that
International community has given billions of dollars
to Liberia to help our plight. But we do not see a
single report indicating specific program of work, or
a budget or operations support system, or a set of
management processes within the local community to
ease our pain. Yet Liberians have remain very
flexible and adaptable to the increasing danger
simply because of the multi-faceted nature of our
resistance to natural and disease emergencies.”
Another interviewee expressed: “Ebola started 8
months ago but we are yet to true analysis of
stakeholders on the ground, who are working with
local leaders and different health cluster partners to
build a dedicated cluster capacities, and ensure the
integration of the capacities of Health Cluster
partners in emergency operations, and avoid
wastages. How can we avoid Ebola elsewhere if the
International community does not undertake a
stakeholder analysis of local partners?”
All three comments above suggest a situation that
requires systemic healthcare infrastructure with
established procedures that prevents common
challenges of interactions among factors and leads to
the dynamism of future changes to global public
health. Such systems will contribute to a global early
warning function and global health emergency
workforces—something that aligns with WHO’s
plans to define and promote acceptance of common
professional standards, and build a robust capacity
for systematized information management as part of

its work on supporting health workforces and
technical networks [30].

4.1. Standards for Resilient Society
Advances in our understanding of disaster
resilience in Western society are yet to match the
increasing need for leadership in developing
countries during disaster situations—quite often a lot
more deadly with much less infrastructures available
to manage the disaster and safe lives [7][25].
Resilience is quite often universal in meaning but
may be unique in applications. Attempts to apply
resilience that requires doing anything to stay alive
may lead the resilient person to taking desperate
actions. This interviewee was present in 2015 when
residents of Bushrod Island in Monrovia refused to
allow care workers into their township to provide
medical assistance for patients or even collect bodies
of Ebola victims. “This is not New York or London or
Rome where the residents have many options to
choose from during emergency situation. In Liberia,
we can only make a onetime judgment, unable to
change what happens after the fact.”
Unlike
residents of Dallas or Madrid (where patients had
also been tested positive with the Ebola virus)
Liberians lived in a resilient society with no control
over how things play out once they have taken the
initial actions.
One interviewee explained “The series of failures
by United Nations and CDC during the beginning of
Ebola demonstrates that the entire world remains illprepared to address any threat posed by deadly
epidemics. The Liberian government had not even
invested in basic surveillance capacities allowing the
Ebola virus to initially spread undetected for several
months”. These vulnerable people felt the need to
innovate their approach to the unstructured medical
process by enhancing their resilience. This proves
that different kinds of shocks and stresses within an
already bad healthcare system can combine to bring
new problems or exacerbate existing problems in
unforeseen ways. Liberia was most vulnerable in
2014 to medical problems and lacked the appropriate
resources needed for structured processes of
innovation to deliver scientifically robust solutions
for reducing risk for Ebola spread [24].
The local population showed changes in behavior
and demonstrated appreciation after President Obama
sent military personnel, followed immediately by
large volumes of resources from the international
community to finance the Ebola response. Household
incomes had suffered greatly as a result of loss of
wage jobs and self-employment activities in 2014.
Nearly half of our interviewees confirmed Liberian
household heads who were working in the first half
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of 2014 reported being out of work, with those job
losses concentrated among urban, private-sector
wage-earners. Government workers also faced
furlough. As per gender effect of Ebola and jobs in
Liberia, 60 percent of women versus 40 percent of
men working in early 2014, had ceased to work by
December 2014.
Radical learning is achieved through direct
interaction with people around the leader and
engaging in group activities (including town hall
meetings, conferences, fairs, sports stadiums, etc.)
where the leader explores new ideas and approaches
related to his/her role to get things done immediately.
One local leader lamented: “We are not surprised
that President Sirleaf did not know how to handle this
type of crises. All her cabinet members were out of
the country when we were suffering here during the
previous crises.” This represented opinions from
many in Liberia who assumed the government had
learned from previous national crisis—establishment
of pre-disaster ties and common communication tools
with NGOs—but that proved futile. A government
official defended the leadership position: “This
leadership was aware that nearly every previous
knowledge about crisis management had to be
abandoned in favor of new knowledge and better
outcome. Remember all our old knowledge were
obtained from dealing with a different type of crisis—
civil war, and government coup.”
This is supported by the UN’s high-level panel on
the Global Response to Health Crises report that
acknowledged new and dangerous pathogens can
emerge in any country in the world. The report
warned that “poor living conditions mean developing
countries are particularly vulnerable to impact of
communicable disease outbreaks. Inadequate
sanitation can accelerate disease spread and weak
health systems undermine the capacities to respond”
[29].
Literature also suggest that crisis and leadership
are intertwined since both concepts have a nature to
complement one another [6]. One Liberian living
abroad concluded “The Ebola crises as an event, was
not neatly delineated, but rather of high uncertainty.
Liberians—both home and abroad—looked to the
country leaders for safety and direction. Mrs. Sirleaf
is not only responsible for responding to threats and
uncertainties facing all citizens but also has the
challenge of bringing the situation to a point where
international investors and Liberian citizens abroad
would feel comfortable to return to Liberia and
help.”

4.2. Analysis of Different Dimensions
World Bank (2006) confirmed stagnation in the
national economic for 2014 resulted from low diesel
sales, an 11 percent contraction in money supply
through 2014, and a 30 percent slump in imports By
early 2015 government effort led to decline in new
cases of Ebola. These were also results of domestic
aversion behavior abating along with international
aversion behavior, which was much slower to
respond. By late 2014, income shock and higher
prices for key staples have resulted in widespread
food insecurity. More than ninety percent of
households interviewed have cited food insecurity as
an issue in the survey [29].
Liberia’s mining sector remained resilient during
the Ebola outbreak, although investments to expand
capacity remain on hold. Another challenge was
posed by the slowdowns in Chinese and in European
economics, leading to significant decline in iron ore
prices—falling to about half in 2015. The resilience
of manual workers in the rubber farms of Liberia kept
the country’s second largest export faring a little
better—falling by only 30 percent.
As Liberians struggled through a very
deteriorating economic, the leadership had to respond
with the appropriate approach, aware that it was
resulting to several thousand deaths. Resilience
entails activities that are meant to be focused in
progressive stages. It begins with i) preventive
measures, followed by ii) mitigation and followed
closely by iii) critical decision making by leadership,
and then finally iv) the eventual push towards a
return to normalcy.
“We are very happy for the private-sector
construction that is taking place as a result of the
Ebola-related construction. As this type of
construction contract winds down, there is a
reduction of domestic cement production. Two
Chinese contractors resumed work on World Bank
roads projects in December 2014, in addition to
many new construction in preparations for reopening of schools in the spring of 2015.“
Resilient leadership in such a situation requires a
contradictory blend of talent for clear-eyed analysis
and the ability to take bold action—something shown
by President Barrack Obama in sending American
soldiers to Liberia when nearly every airline
concluded it wasn’t safe to fly into Liberia for fear of
employees contracting this deadly disease. Like most
national crises, Ebola was accompanied by a high
degree of uncertainty. Thus, managing Ebola
preparation and recovery proved impossible for the
Liberian government. The Liberian government
demonstrated resilience through their leadership—
aware that citizens expected an outcome that would
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keep them alive. It was this type of resilience in the
gaze of epidemic that defined the true devastation of
Ebola in Liberia.

4.3. Society and Cultural Ties
While the outside world struggled to comprehend
any perceived benefit of physical interactions
(handshakes, hugging and similar behaviors during
the Ebola crisis), Liberians were culturally resilience,
regularly examined the benefits in their interactions
with others—who could have been infected with the
deadly disease—but only if they believed that
participating in the cultural exchange process would
bring them little satisfactory rewards during a time of
total grim in the local society.
“Because of Ebola control, we are expected to
live as individuals. We are not allowed to touch our
family and friends by hugging and handshakes. Ebola
has also forced us to move from big cities into rural
villages, and work as farmers.”
Despite this
interviewee claims, harvests for spring 2015 was
significantly plumage. Eighty percent of participants
blamed the reduction in crops to reduced labor
sharing, leading to further reductions in food supply
for 2015.
“As Ebola spreads throughout the country, the
rural community has become increasingly uncertain
with constrained resources. This has forced local
leaders to result to autonomous innovations which
should be flexible and instinct-driven, that will allow
us to function through a variety of disturbances in
this challenging and very deadly situation.” This
comment from a local community leader confirms
conclusions from literature that operational
effectiveness during outbreaks and emergencies
requires leadership positioning themselves as
operational
organization
while
maintaining
leadership in technical expertise.
“Our leadership is valuable to solving this
problem because our community is on the front-line
of the Ebola outbreak. We are responsible and
accountable for issuing appropriate alerts and
responding to a suspected Ebola cases. We need
health systems and architecture that contain
foundational capabilities for effective preparedness
and response.” This comment, also from a local
community leader, confirms literature about the
inadequate implementation of national obligations
under the weak health systems, governance
challenges, and poor engagement with communities
hampered the ability of national authorities to stem
the spread of the virus [17][29].
Similar comments from Interviewees support
literature that leaders of global healthcare (WHO)
should proactively define and promote acceptance of

common professional
standards
on health
interventions, sharing information and handling
personal health data. Investing in worldwide Health
Systems would build robust capacity for systematized
information management and protocols to enable
health data from multiple sources to be shared [33].
Implementation of a sustainable emergency system,
procedures and capacity to develop and update
resilience to deadly diseases should be an ongoing
objective of WHO, including rapid availability of an
interactive, accessible IS repository for Ebola
management.
Many Liberians used mobile technology to spread
information about government policies and plans for
actions relating to suspected Ebola cases and Ebola
control team arrivals into different villages. “It would
have been in national interest to take advantage of
existing mobile technology (spread throughout the
remote districts of Liberia) to deliver a strong public
health message to the Liberians. Isn’t it mindblowing when people report the lack of
communication technology between Monrovia and
Ganta (around 200 miles apart) yet family members
in USA (more than 6000 miles away) were
practically in constant communications—via mobile
technology—immediately after a family member
showed symptom of serious illness? These comments
demonstrate that in the absence of a well-functioning
healthcare infrastructure, any country can be exposed
to a catastrophe far more destructive than national
security, as experienced by Liberia in 2014.
Resilience in such environment allows the
institutionalization of political agendas when
budgeting for national healthcare and avoiding
improper prioritizations, which may increase the risk
of deadly disease spread, lower the morale of health
care workers, and diminish patients’ quality of life
[5][14]. Resilience in culture meant caring for sick
family members—something very central to West
African culture. The researcher noticed a wellestablished communications system between groups
of Liberians spread around the world, usually as part
of similar descendants of past inhabitants of certain
families within a specific territory. This is exclusive
of other groups within a small territory, and formed
by involuntary membership of an inclusive category.
All people privileged to the news of a seriously sick
family member would usually belong to one tribal
group, by reason of being extended families and/or
inhabiting the region—sometimes referred to as
normative tribalism, and semantically correct to
describe it as a form of local-mindedness. Because
certain financially influential members of such
extended family may now be living in the West, it
has become imperative to use mobile technology to
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spread such sick news—thus, improving explain the
role of family ties through culture during resilience to
a deadly disease.
“Ebola outbreak has not been able to keep our
residents away from complementary leisure facilities,
and other tourist resources frequently used to meet
their needs for home-based tourism. We use friendly
attitude—hugs
and
handshakes
at
every
opportunity—to establish channels of communication
with the outside world. Research aligns with these
comments that once established, negative reputations
are very difficult to change [18][28].
A good strategy for developing a national
healthcare infrastructure must have certain essential
elements. Such strategy must include standards for
effective data sharing.

5. Research Limitation and Future
Research
This paper uses data from a telephone interview
which is a rarely used research method but the
justification is the researcher’s inability to travel to
the research locations during a deadly disease
outbreak. While the results of this research may not
be generalizable, due to the rare occurrence of Ebola
outbreak, they definitely fill a critical gap in the
literature and also be applicable in similar contexts.
One limitation of this method is the lack of attempt to
address the effect of non-relations sampling.
Intuitively obtaining information from people who
are considered old friends and former colleagues, as
well as close contacts of the researcher’s family
members and their neighbors—all facing life-anddeath situations—making it more likely the survey
would produce specific theme-relevant material.
This exploratory study has raised several issues
that provide fruitful avenues for future research in the
area of disaster resilience in developing countries.
First, several contingencies have been identified
(stages in decision making process, involvement of
local authorities, etc.) as possible explanations for
strong resilience during a deadly disease outbreak in
developing countries.
The study will now be
expanded to include longitudinal and participatory
research techniques [32] involving local researchers
based at the University of Liberia and other partners
with NGOs in Monrovia. Future research on the
impact of disaster resilience in developing countries
will also examine the inclusion of additional
constructs.

6. Conclusions
To answer our major questions, we have seen
how Liberians exhibit resilience, evidencing normal
life in the face of adversity. Despite Ebola killing
children, women and old people, there was no
evidence of any negative effects at the individual,
family, community, and cultural levels—contributing
to an understanding of resilience processes within
non-Western populations. Although some general
trends in disaster resilience may extend beyond good
leadership /government, resilience here was strongly
influenced by culture.
For resilience research, social competence has
generally been operationalized on the basis of
observable, behavioral criteria, with assessments
based on achievements [8] [13]. This paper aligns
with literature that demonstrate the importance of
ensuring resilience processes are informed—and
where possible set—by those who must change [7].
Additionally, the paper has aligned with the
unfortunate events in Liberian history, especially the
Ebola outbreak and argues for seeing communities
not merely as victims of disaster but also as agents of
resilience.
By early 2015, the international community—led
by USA—had to send both military and medical
personnel to help Liberian government control Ebola
spread.
Through this strategy, the Liberian
leadership demonstrated a certain type of resilience,
being flexible in decision making and operations,
adaptability to disaster conditions, and effective
communication with other stakeholders and the
public as the most valuable resource required for
leading a developing country through the outbreak of
a deadly disease.
The second implication of this finding is the
protective versus vulnerability effects across the
populations studied. For instance, while the local
population was frightened and intentionally still
indoors—being protective with regard to disruptive
behaviors during a medical crisis, the society was
functioning as a vulnerability factor for other
domains and therefore being described as public
disobedience. For an economically disadvantaged
citizen, facing Ebola, on the other hand, increasing
freedom to express their frustration at the system was
a desirable outcome.
Apart from public demonstration, caring for
former family member was another variable that was
found to be a vulnerability factor [14]. This variable,
too, has been previously shown to serve protective
functions, in experimental as well as longitudinal
investigations [2].
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Previous theoretical and empirical works in the
area have contained cautionary statements on the use
of terms such as “invulnerable” and “resilient.” For
instance, it has often been noted that resilience is not
necessarily continuous over time but is, instead,
interspersed
with
setbacks
under
certain
circumstances [8][9][26]. Evidence that resilient
population in this study were significantly more
depressed and anxious than were government
officials suggests that while the type of problems
developed may vary, some type of difficulties may
inevitably be associated with a population gazing at
Ebola.
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